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I. INTRODUCTION 
An unpromising title, this, in the seventh year of the third millenni-
um of the Common Era; rather like “Recent Developments in Ptolemaic 
Astronomy” or “Betamax—a Technology Whose Time Has Come.” My 
grandfather’s dream, the faith of my younger days, has turned to ashes. 
And yet, I remain persuaded that Karl Marx has something important to 
teach us about the world in which we live today. 
In what follows, I propose to take as my text a famous statement 
from Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy1—a 
sort of preliminary sketch of Das Kapital2—and see what it can tell us 
about the capitalism of our day. I shall try to show you that Marx was 
fundamentally right about the direction in which capitalism would devel-
op, but that because of his failure to anticipate three important features of 
the mature capitalist world, his optimism concerning the outcome of that 
development was misplaced. Along the way, I shall take a fruitful detour 
through the arid desert of financial accounting theory. 
Here is the famous passage, from the preface of the Contribution, 
published in 1859: 
No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for 
which there is room in it have been developed, and new, higher re-
lations of production never appear before the material conditions of 
their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.3 
Although Marx spoke generally about all social orders—by which he 
meant ancient slavery, medieval feudalism, modern capitalism, and the 
socialism he anticipated—it was principally the transition from feudalism 
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to capitalism on which he focused his attention. The development of 
latifundia in late Roman times, he thought, was a preparation for feudal-
ism within the womb of the slave economy of the empire. But when it 
came to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, his historiographical 
research, which was quite extensive for his day, persuaded him that all of 
the structural elements of a full-blown capitalist economy and society 
could be found in rudimentary form in the latter decades and centuries of 
the old feudal order: exchange based on money rather than barter; wage 
labor; production for sale rather than consumption; the transformation of 
money into investment capital; the appearance of commodity production; 
the dissolution of legal and customary constraints on production and ex-
change; and so on. In Marx’s view, the great political upheavals of sev-
enteenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and the Americas were caused 
by the growing and eventually unsustainable contradiction between the 
economic power being acquired by the new entrepreneurial classes and 
the formal legal and political power still exercised by the landed aristoc-
racy and its allies in the clergy. 
But Marx also believed that he was witnessing, in his own time, a 
new contradiction between the legal and political power of bourgeois 
capitalism, which by the mid-nineteenth century had taken a secure hold 
of both the marketplace and the state, and the emerging but still subordi-
nate industrial working class. It was, as Marx made clear in his 1848 
tract The Communist Manifesto,4 a world historical irony that every effort 
by capitalists to expand the scope and efficiency of their productive forc-
es had the unintended consequence of promoting the unification and self-
conscious awareness of their mortal enemy, the working class. As later 
European Marxists would say, Capital was unintentionally but inexora-
bly transforming labor from a class in itself into a class for itself. The end 
result of this dynamic process, Marx believed, would be a clash as mo-
mentous as that which replaced feudalism with capitalism. This time, it 
would be capitalism’s fate to be consigned to the dustbin of history and 
to be replaced by socialism. 
It followed immediately from the logic of Marx’s analysis that rev-
olutionary change in the most advanced capitalist countries would be 
brought about, if at all, through the actions of the most advanced sector 
of the working class—the skilled industrial workers in those industries 
that had achieved the most efficient, sophisticated forms of capitalist 
production. Marx was not sentimental about the unskilled toiling masses, 
to whom he referred rather contemptuously as lumpenproletariat. 
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Marx never presented us with the same sort of detailed analysis of 
the transition from capitalism to socialism that he so brilliantly laid out in 
his historical account of the development of capitalism. It is up to us 
therefore to try to imagine what such a transition might look like, taking 
as our guiding clue his remark about “the material conditions” maturing 
in “the womb” of the old order. Since the capitalist firm is the central 
institution through which production and distribution is managed in capi-
talism, it is there, if anywhere, that he believed we should expect the 
“new, higher relations of production” to appear. What can this possibly 
mean? 
II. IN THE WOMB OF THE OLD 
In the early stage of capitalist development, the characteristic capi-
talist firm is a small, single-product manufacturing operation presided 
over rather closely by an entrepreneur who is both owner and principal 
manager. Present-day observers accustomed to the almost complete sepa-
ration of legal ownership from effective control characteristic of the 
modern corporation may find this difficult to remember. For the implica-
tions of the transformation of the owner-operated firm into a limited lia-
bility joint stock corporation, one may still usefully consult the classic 
1932 work by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property.5 
A firm of the original sort, in the language of modern economic 
theory, is a price-taker at both ends. Take for example the entrepreneur. 
The entrepreneur purchases raw materials, labor, and other inputs in a 
competitive market at a price over which he (and it is, almost always, he) 
has no control. The size of his purchases is vanishingly small in compari-
son with the market as a whole and consequently he must simply shop 
around for the best price, and pay what the market dictates. The entre-
preneur stands in a like relation to the price of his output, for when he 
returns to the market to sell what has been produced in his factory, he 
finds that his sales are negligible in relation to the market as a whole. 
Thus, though he makes a profit sufficient to support a comfortable exist-
ence and also to permit further expansion of his enterprise, he is, and ex-
periences himself to be, at the mercy of market forces beyond his control, 
and even, in the early stages of capitalist development, beyond his ken. 
Characteristically, the process by which inputs are transformed into 
output in our entrepreneur’s factory is simple and relatively direct, alt-
hough there may be temporary intermediate products as the result of a 
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first process of transformation, serving as the inputs into a subsequent 
process. Flax is spun into thread and woven into linen; iron ore and coke 
are transformed into steel; wheat is turned into flour and is baked into 
bread. 
The accounting procedures required to keep track of the production 
process, in value terms, although revolutionary in relation to the proce-
dures of the pre-capitalist era, are by modern standards elementary and 
transparent. Profits are simply the difference between the cost of in-
puts—wages and rent included—and the price at which the output is 
sold. The rate of profit can be computed directly as the ratio of annual 
profit to the value of the capital invested in buildings, machinery, raw 
materials, and so forth. 
There is, to be sure, the first suggestion of a theoretical complexity 
in the necessity of assigning some fraction of the cost of the buildings 
and machinery—the “fixed capital”—to the cost of inputs of an annual 
period. But Marx, in common with all other classical economists, simply 
assumes that a machine yields up, each year, a portion of its purchase 
price equal to the fraction of its expected lifetime represented by one 
year. A power loom that can be expected to last five years, costing one 
thousand dollars new, can be thought of equally well as having cost the 
capitalist two hundred dollars in each year. Very shortly, we shall see 
that this elementary calculation is in fact quite problematical. 
At this earliest stage of capitalist development, nothing remotely re-
sembling economic planning can be said to take place on any level save 
that of the individual firm. Prices, wage levels, aggregate demand and 
supply, the economy-wide movement of capital, all are completely be-
yond control and are experienced by all as though they were forces of 
nature. Within the firm, of course, there is increasingly careful calcula-
tion, as individual entrepreneurs, pressed by their competitors, examine 
every element of their operation in the effort to reduce costs and thus 
increase profits. It is hardly surprising, under these circumstances, that 
owners resort to such petty subterfuges as tampering with the clocks in 
their factories so as to extract an extra few minutes of labor from their 
miserably paid workers. 
The state of affairs we have been describing may strike economic 
theorists as ideal—indeed, as Pareto-optimal! But it can hardly be said to 
strike the entrepreneurs as in the least satisfactory. To them, it is a condi-
tion of perpetual uncertainty and anxiety. Even the most careful and ra-
tionally calculating entrepreneur is utterly at the mercy of market forces, 
which he cannot control and can scarcely predict. Though he may be in 
the grip of one or another of the self-serving rationalizations that cele-
brate the productivity and progressive thrust of the system as a whole, he 
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will, as a prudent businessman, be eternally on the alert for some way to 
diminish the degree of his servitude to the market. 
There are essentially two things our entrepreneur can do to achieve 
a more secure relationship to the market forces, and whether by foresight 
or accident, he and his fellows pretty soon attempt both of them. First, he 
can increase the scale of his operations, so as to cease to be a negligible 
factor either in the market in which he buys his inputs or in the market in 
which he sells his output. Second, he can partially overcome his depend-
ence upon markets by engaging in a bit of what economists call “vertical 
integration”—he can start to produce some of the inputs that previously 
he was forced to buy in the market. 
The first tactic, increasing the scale of operations, is illustrated easi-
ly enough from the history of American capitalism. When the Great At-
lantic and Pacific Tea Company (or A&P) decided in the early twentieth 
century to expand beyond its original role as a supermarket grocery 
chain, and go into the business of making jelly under its Ann Page label, 
it turned to the grape-growing valleys of California for its principal input. 
The growers were relatively small producers who had, until then, sold 
their crop in a competitive market to large numbers of small producers. 
A&P launched its Ann Page line on so large a scale that it needed to buy 
up the crop yields of entire valleys for its jelly-making operation. As a 
consequence, it became virtually the sole buyer for the output of large 
numbers of small growers. It was able to guarantee purchase of a grow-
er’s entire crop even before the growing season had begun, in return for 
which it acquired the power to dictate the price at which it would buy the 
crop. In this way, it gained a significant measure of control over its input 
market, and this in turn allowed A&P to institute production and market-
ing plans based on an assured input at an assured price. 
A further extension of the entrepreneur’s conquest of market forces 
is exemplified by a practice of Sears & Roebuck. Sears would not merely 
buy the entire output of its suppliers, thereby making them subservient to 
its dictates in a manner analogous to that of A&P. Sears buyers would 
meet with representatives of the supplying companies and dictated the 
specifications of the goods it wished to purchase, along with the quantity 
it wanted. The suppliers then produced to order, secure in their ability to 
sell their entire output. Sears also dictated the price it would pay, thereby 
completely undermining the play of market forces. Under these circum-
stances, Sears executives could truly plan their seasonal line, not in the 
sense of merely predicting accurately the character, price, and availabil-
ity of the goods they wished to sell, but in the full sense of deciding what 
they wanted and then commanding that it be produced. 
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At this point, it should be noted, a new form of calculation enters 
into corporate planning. Previously, a corporation like Sears would bar-
gain as hard as it could to lower the price of its inputs. Now, however, 
when it decided what price to specify for the total output it proposed to 
buy from a supplier, it had to balance its desire to obtain its input at the 
lowest possible price against its interest in keeping a reliable supplier in 
business. 
Firms can undertake analogous maneuvers when offering their out-
put to the market. As a firm grows larger, it less and less confronts a 
market for its output that is opaque and independent of its will. Increas-
ingly, it becomes a price-maker rather than a price-taker in its output as 
well as its input market. Instead of short-term sales tactics, focused al-
most entirely on price competition, it begins to think strategically about 
total market share, adding product differentiation to price as a means of 
increasing, or merely securing, a stable market share on which it can 
predicate corporate planning. 
As the firm grows larger, it progressively diminishes its level of un-
certainty and reduces its dependence on the impersonal workings of the 
market. It is driven to achieve this independence by the same self-interest 
that motivates it in the more fully competitive market environment at an 
earlier stage of capitalism. To whatever extent they are able, entrepre-
neurs or managers seek to substitute planning in the full sense indicated 
above for mere calculation of profitability. 
One of the inevitable consequences of this move from calculation to 
planning is a corresponding loss of simple clarity of goal. When an en-
trepreneur is locked in cutthroat competition with other small producers, 
he has very little choice of feasible entrepreneurial goals. Short-term 
profitability is the condition of survival. Growth—for economies of 
scale, for technological innovation, and as a means of liberation from 
market forces—virtually is thrust upon him. At this stage, there is no 
room for what eventually comes to be celebrated as “industrial states-
manship.” A firm may flourish one season and be driven to the wall the 
next. 
Once the firm has reached a certain level of size and control over its 
input and output prices, however, the managers of the firm (for at this 
stage, it is likely that the individual entrepreneur has been replaced by 
salaried managers) must choose among a variety of corporate goals: 
short-term profit maximization, longer-term profit-maximization, en-
hancement of the firm’s stock market performance (which is, of course, 
not necessarily identical with profit maximization), managerial stability, 
attractiveness to potential takeover financiers, resistance to a financial 
takeover, and so forth. 
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There is no calculus that dictates how managers are to decide 
among these goals. They are genuine alternatives, corresponding to dif-
ferent and incompatible managerial ambitions. In a fundamental sense, 
these choices are political rather than economic in character. What dis-
tinguishes them from what are ordinarily considered political alternatives 
is not their logical structure, but simply the identity of the constituencies 
to whom the decision-makers are accountable in the making of the 
choices. 
The second means available to entrepreneurs for overcoming the 
tyranny of the market—incorporation into their enterprise of stages in the 
production process that were previously carried out by independent sup-
plier firms—constitutes an even more important theoretical departure 
from the logic of capitalism and a corresponding movement toward a 
precursor of socialist planning. This time, let us use a simple hypothet-
ical example. 
Imagine a firm that has been producing cardboard cartons in a fac-
tory with 80,000 square feet of usable floor space. We may suppose that 
the firm buys the cardboard in large sheets from a cardboard producer, 
and then stamps, folds, and staples the cardboard into cartons. Cardboard 
cartons are the sole product of the firm, and abstracting from a number of 
issues to which we shall return, the accounting procedures used to keep 
track of costs and determine profit margins are quite elementary and 
straightforward. The firm’s accountants have made a few standard as-
sumptions about the depreciation rates of the machinery, and we may 
simplify things by assuming that there are no tax considerations (acceler-
ated depreciation, etc.) to complicate or warp the bookkeeping. Profit is 
then the difference between costs and revenues, and the profit rate is cal-
culated on the value of invested capital, the profit margin on the differ-
ence between cost and sale price of each unit of cartons. 
The market for cardboard sheets, we may suppose, is fluctuating 
and uncertain, and the carton manufacturing company’s manager be-
lieves that he can stabilize his costs and increase his profits by producing 
his own cardboard, rather than buying it on the market. Because there are 
25,000 square feet of unused space on the factory floor, he allocates that 
space to cardboard production and puts a young, ambitious supervisor in 
charge of the new branch of the firm. The question arises: How shall the 
profitability of this cardboard manufacturing activity be computed? 
There are two reasons why this question needs answering from the 
firm manager’s point of view. First, of course, he must decide whether it 
is better to produce the cardboard in-house or continue to buy it in the 
market. That question, we may suppose, is relatively easy to answer. Se-
cond, as the manager of a firm with two divisions, each headed by an 
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ambitious divisional chief, he must evaluate the relative profitability of 
the two divisions in order to decide which division chief will be tapped 
for promotion when and if a new, higher-level job in the corporation 
comes open. In large, modern capitalist firms, this bureaucratic question 
of internal advancement is of much greater importance to everyone in 
management than the older question of profitability of the firm as a 
whole. Profitability becomes a key to managerial advancement, not 
merely to owner satisfaction. 
The new division manager, eager to make as good a record for her-
self as possible, argues as follows to the accountant, whose job it is to 
come up with profitability estimates at the monthly meeting of officers of 
the firm: “The depreciation on the factory building is exactly the same 
whether we run the cardboard-producing activity or not, as are the gen-
eral overhead costs for utilities, telephone and so forth. Save for some 
small increase in operating overhead, the cardboard-production experi-
ment imposes no new fixed costs on the firm at all. What is more, the 
bookkeeping, ordering, and shipping departments can absorb the relative-
ly small flow of work generated by the new division without any increase 
in personnel or overtime costs. Hence, in figuring the input costs as 
against revenues for cardboard production, the only items that ought to 
be charged off against the new division are such direct costs as the new 
machinery required, the wages of the extra workers taken on to make the 
cardboard, and the cost of the raw materials.” 
The manager of the old carton division, who knows a serious threat 
to his job when he sees one, flatly refuses to agree to this self-serving bit 
of accounting sleight of hand. What the cardboard-production manager 
has proposed will, if accepted, result in a dramatically higher rate of re-
turn to her division’s investment than can possibly be earned in his. How 
long will it be before the president of the firm gets it into his head to 
have them switch places with an appropriate readjustment of their sala-
ries! He proposes that all of the fixed costs of the enterprise be allocated 
to the two divisions in proportion to the percentage of the floor space 
they occupy (a method of allocation that happens to favor him a bit more 
than the equally plausible proposal to allocate in proportion to the reve-
nues generated by the two divisions). 
The president of the firm, confronted with this disagreement be-
tween his two division managers, turns to the accountant, whom he asks 
for an objective, impartial, scientific ruling. And he now gets a distinct 
shock, for his accountant—who is as honest as she is competent—
informs him that as a matter of fact (or, more precisely, as a matter of 
accounting theory) there is no objective, impartial scientific answer to 
the question: How shall the fixed costs of a joint-production enterprise be 
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allocated among the several distinct productive activities of the enter-
prise? 
This is a rather startling proposition on which the entire argument 
of this Essay rests. I need therefore to spend some time explaining it 
clearly and indicating the grounds on which it rests. My guide here is a 
pair of monographs written by a Canadian Professor of Accounting, Ar-
thur L. Thomas and published by the American Accounting Association. 
The first monograph, The Allocation Problem in Financial Accounting 
Theory, appeared in 19696; the second, The Allocation Problem, Part 
Two,7 was published five years later. Thomas seems to be something of 
an iconoclastic radical masquerading as a nerdy bean-counting number-
cruncher. In the driest language imaginable, he argues ploddingly, pains-
takingly, but devastatingly that a central activity of financial account-
ants—the allocation of costs to the outputs of a firm—has no objective 
rationale whatsoever, being based rather on an arbitrary choice of one 
from among a number of alternative incompatible patterns of allocation. 
What this means, in plain language, is that an accountant, speaking pro-
fessionally, cannot tell the management of a firm just what a unit of out-
put costs and hence how much of the profit of the firm can be attributed 
to its sale. 
Thomas himself draws no larger lesson from this extraordinary 
conclusion, but in what follows, I will try to show that it has the most 
profound implications for our understanding of the manner in which 
something very like socialism evolves in the womb of the capitalist firm. 
Incidentally, in his correspondence with me, Thomas seemed to evince a 
good deal of pleasure at the radical conclusions I drew from his work, 
but it goes without saying that when I venture beyond the confines of 
financial accounting theory, I am entirely on my own. 
The accountant is presented by the firm with the raw data concern-
ing the costs of the firm’s activities: invoices for materials, bills for rent, 
electricity, and insurance, hourly wages and managerial salaries, invento-
ries, and so forth. His job (if we imagine this to be Thomas himself as the 
accountant) is then to figure out how much of each of these factor costs 
to allocate or impute to each unit of salable output, and thereby to calcu-
late the contribution to profits being made by each division of the firm. 
He is to do this as objectively and accurately as the data permit, not al-
lowing his assessments to be influenced either by the hopes and ambi-
tions of the company management or by the particular aspirations of one 
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 7. Arthur L. Thomas, The Allocation Problem: Part Two, in STUDIES IN ACCOUNTING 
RESEARCH #9 (974). 
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division of the firm rather than another. His conclusions can then be pre-
sented to the investing public as a neutral evaluation of the performance 
of the firm, and to the management as a sound basis on which to make 
corporate decisions. 
There are three different features of the activities of large capitalist 
firms that defeat the accountant’s effort to find neutral, objective meth-
ods for allocating costs to individual outputs, or to the subdivisions of the 
firm responsible for their production. These are the phenomena of fixed 
capital, inventories, and joint production. Let us look at each of them 
briefly in turn. 
Fixed capital is capital that lasts longer than one cycle of produc-
tion, which is to say, longer than it takes to produce one unit of output. 
The examples are endless: a robotic riveting machine on an automobile 
assembly line that can be used in the assembly of three thousand vehicles 
before it must be replaced, a power loom that wears out after being used 
to make ten thousand yards of cloth, an office copying machine that must 
be replaced on average every twenty thousand copies, an office building 
good for fifty years. Some of these items will have a resale value when it 
is time to replace them; others will simply have to be scrapped. Each of 
these factors of production costs the firm something, and that cost must 
in some way be apportioned to the units of output to whose production it 
contributes. In other words, the accountant must select a schedule of de-
preciation for the productive factor. (I am entirely abstracting from the 
enormous complications introduced by the depreciation schedules stipu-
lated by the Internal Revenue Service, which of course have nothing 
whatever to do with the actual wear and tear on the item being depreciat-
ed. These words are being written at my desk in the tiny pied-a-terre that 
my wife and I bought in Paris several years ago, which we rent out to 
readers of the New York Review of Books. Our apartment is in a seven-
teenth-century building whose value has been appreciating steadily for 
the past four hundred years or so but when it comes time for me to fill 
out IRS Schedule E—Rents and Royalties—I am permitted to adopt the 
fiction that in twenty-two-and-a-half years, its value will have disap-
peared.) 
Without going into the details of Thomas’s monographs, let me in-
dicate some of the incompatible alternatives available to the accountant. 
He may assume that the fixed capital yields up equal parts of its purchase 
price to each unit if output produced with its aid. This was in fact the 
assumption Marx made in Capital. Alternatively, he may assume that the 
machine loses equal shares of its value in equal time periods—one-tenth 
during each year of a ten-year life, for example. This is not at all equiva-
lent to the first alternative because the machine may be used in the pro-
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duction of differing numbers of units in different years, either because of 
speed-ups and slow-downs in the production process, or because the ma-
chine has a breaking-in period before it reaches maximum efficiency, 
followed by a period of optimum functioning, after which as it wears out 
it is less and less capable of spewing forth product at the same rate. Each 
of these assumptions will yield a different depreciation schedule and 
hence a different quantum of cost imputed to units of the output. 
Alternatively, the accountant may adopt an entirely different ap-
proach, and by appealing to an existing market for second-hand capital 
goods, impute to each year’s output the difference between what the ma-
chine would have sold for in that market at the beginning of the year, and 
what it would have sold for at the end of the year. Or—and this will yield 
a totally different set of numbers—he may compare what the company 
would have to pay for a second-hand machine at the beginning of the 
year with what it would have to pay at the end of the year for a second-
hand machine one year older. But we have not even begun to ring the 
changes on this apparently elementary accounting problem, for the ac-
countant may impute to a year’s output what it would cost the company 
to rent a machine for one year, even though the company has already 
purchased the machine, which is thus, from its point of view, a sunk cost. 
Indeed, Thomas actually considers the suggestion (which has been treat-
ed respectfully in accounting circles, to my surprise) that the company 
write off the entire cost of the machine in the year it is purchased and 
treat it in all the subsequent years of its use as a free good, like the air 
that is required for the burning of fuel. The accountant may even, in any 
given year, choose whichever of these methods of allocation yields the 
lowest number, on the theory that he is thereby telling the management 
what its most efficient choice would be at any moment. 
This litany of options available to the accountant does not begin to 
exhaust the logical possibilities. The problem faced by the firm, as 
Thomas makes clear, is that accounting theory offers no way of deciding 
which of them is objectively right—which accurately reveals to the man-
agement of the firm the true structure of its costs. Indeed, although the 
data with which the accountant works are, or can be made to be, factually 
accurate, there seems simply to be no answer to the question, “Just how 
much does each unit of output cost the firm to produce?” Thus, returning 
for a moment to our cardboard and box factory, the accountant cannot 
resolve the dispute between the division managers in a neutral and unbi-
ased manner befitting a chartered accountant. Some of the many options 
are likely to favor the head of the box division, others will make the head 
of the cardboard division look better. 
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Similar problems arise when the accountant turns to the task of de-
ciding how to carry on the books of the firm the cost of the stocks of ma-
terial in its inventory. A firm acquires a stock of some input that it re-
quires for its productive activities—coal for its furnaces, thread for its 
power loom, gravel for its cement mixers, diesel fuel for its trucks. 
Stocks characteristically are composed of units acquired at different 
times and at different prices. For the most part, stocks consist of homo-
geneous units—one gallon of diesel fuel is much like another, one bag of 
cement indistinguishable from another. (The homogenization of inputs, 
and the corresponding outputs, is, as Marx points out in Capital, one of 
the signal features of capitalism, and distinguishes it from the craft pro-
duction that it replaces. It is accompanied by a like homogenization of 
the labor performed by the workers employed by a capitalist firm.) 
How shall our accountant proceed in allocating the cost of inputs 
drawn from stock and thrown into production (as Marx liked to put it)? 
He may assume that the first unit withdrawn is the first unit that was 
added to the inventory, and he will then impute to the output whatever 
price was paid for it. This is the rule of allocation known in accounting 
circles as FIFO—First In, First Out. He will still have to adjust this price 
for the opportunity cost incurred by tying up that amount of capital in 
inventory, which in turn will require some choice from among the many 
alternative ways of computing the relevant rate of interest. 
Alternatively, our accountant may opt for LIFO—Last In, First 
Out—rather than FIFO, or some average of the two ways of computing 
costs, and so forth. Because the price of stocks typically varies over the 
life of an inventory, it can make a very considerable difference to the 
profit or loss imputed to a unit of output which of these accounting con-
ventions is selected. If I may echo the late unlamented Richard Nixon, it 
would be easy, but it would be wrong, to suppose that choosing one ac-
counting rule and sticking to it will sanitize the accounting process and 
obviate these problems. It takes only a little mathematical imagination 
and some patience to construct examples in which, as a consequence of 
the pattern of variation of factor prices, the choice of FIFO over LIFO, or 
any of the other alternatives, can over time systematically advantage one 
division of a corporation over another. 
For example, if a factor input has been falling steadily in price for 
some years, FIFO will make the division using that factor look unusually 
profitable, for the accounting convention will make its costs appear to 
fall. On the other hand, LIFO will make it appear that its profitability is 
in decline. If two divisions are in competition within the corporation, one 
using inputs whose price is falling and the other using inputs whose price 
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is rising, the choice between FIFO and LIFO can have an inverse effect 
on their relative profitability. 
Adverting once again to our cardboard example, when the manager 
of the box division draws cardboard from the inventory being accumulat-
ed by the cardboard division, he must for purposes of keeping track of 
his profitability choose one convention for imputing the internal cost of 
the cardboard to his box output. Just as he lobbied for an allocation of the 
cost of space to his division that most advantaged him vis-à-vis his fel-
low division manager, so now he will try to persuade the accountant to 
select an inventory convention that has the same beneficial impact on his 
bottom line. 
Which brings us to the third and most problematic of the sources of 
accounting ambiguity—joint production—for that is precisely what is at 
stake when it comes time to allocate the cost of the space in which the 
two divisions carry out their productive activities. Speaking generally, 
joint production is the use of a factor input to produce two distinct sala-
ble outputs. In this case, the input is the company’s building and the out-
puts are cardboard and boxes. An oil refinery usually generates an entire 
array of products from its processing of crude, as does a slaughterhouse 
from its transformation of beef on the hoof into an assortment of meat 
products, hides, and other outputs. It is not too much to say that in a 
modern corporation, joint production is the rule rather than the exception. 
The accountant, in preparing an annual report of a firm, is called 
upon to allocate the cost of the inputs that are used jointly in the produc-
tion process. As Thomas demonstrates, there is no neutral pattern of allo-
cations that can determine how much of the cost of such a factor is to be 
allocated or imputed to each unit of the several outputs in whose produc-
tion process it is employed. The problems are manifold, as should by 
now be obvious. Thomas cites as one example an attempt to distinguish 
the cost of a building in which are carried out production processes hav-
ing multiple outputs from the cost of the land on which it is built. The 
problem is that tearing down the building would so significantly alter the 
land values in the surrounding neighborhood that the sale price of the 
cleared land would in no way reflect the cost to be allocated among the 
several outputs. 
Well, enough is enough. Even these remarks, which might be char-
acterized as accounting lite, are more than any sensible layman would 
want to read. Why does all this matter to someone like myself who is 
trying to assess Marx’s analysis of the transition from capitalism to so-
cialism? 
Perhaps the best way to begin is with the classic essay by Ludwig 
von Mises entitled Economic Calculation in the Socialist Common-
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wealth.8 First published in the original German version in 1920, and in-
cluded in an English version in Friedrich von Hayek’s widely read 1935 
collection of essays, Collectivist Economic Planning, von Mises’s essay 
is generally thought to be a devastating dismantling of the socialist pen-
chant for central planning. His thesis, in a nutshell, is that since the free 
market does the best possible job of pricing factor inputs, through the 
interplay of individual decisions to buy or sell, the very most that social-
ist planners could do, in the ideal case, would be to mimic the operations 
of the market. Since socialist planners have no hope of achieving that 
ideal, collectivist planning will always be inferior to free market compe-
tition as a way of deciding how most efficiently to employ scarce re-
sources. Thus, contrary to the expectation of Marx and his followers, 
socialist planning can never improve on the unplanned outcome of the 
marketplace but instead will fall disastrously short of that standard, pro-
ducing wastage, bottlenecks, shortages of necessary productive inputs, 
and calamitous failures to meet consumer demand. In the jargon of mod-
ern economists, unfettered capitalism will tend to put an economy on its 
production possibility frontier, while socialist planning will consign an 
economy to a position well below and to the left of that desirable loca-
tion. 
In 1920, von Mises was dead right, and I think it is a fair guess that 
Marx, had he been alive, would have agreed. Von Mises was of course 
looking at the fledgling Bolshevik government that had just seized power 
in Russia, ostensibly in the name of Marx and communism. Russia was 
then still a late feudal economy with a tiny nascent capitalist sector pretty 
much confined to a few cities west of the Urals. The social relations of 
capitalist production had scarcely begun to grow in the womb of feudal-
ism, and nothing remotely resembling socialist relations of production 
could be discerned anywhere in Russia’s economy. The Bolsheviks were 
well-aware of this fact, and engaged in a lively—ultimately bloody—
discussion about whether it was theoretically possible to “skip a stage” 
and go directly from late feudalism to socialism. Marx knew that the an-
swer was no, and so, I suspect, did they, but when one has unexpectedly 
taken control of a vast nation at considerable personal risk, it would have 
seemed unnecessarily doctrinaire to turn the state over to whatever capi-
talists one could find and wait patiently for the slow evolution of new 
social relationships to run its course. Not surprisingly, what emerged in 
Russia, and later in the even vaster peasant society of China, bore no re-
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semblance at all to what Marx had in mind when he spoke of socialism 
growing in the womb of capitalism. 
So von Mises was certainly right with regard to the world he was 
looking at in 1920. The market clearly did a better job of allocating 
scarce capital resources than any group of planners could, even though 
Russia numbered among its intelligentsia some of the best economists in 
the world. (Indeed, it is said that some years later when the young 
Wassily Leontief took his brilliant new technique of linear programming 
to the Soviet Commissars and offered it as a tool for sophisticated central 
planning, they dismissed his offer on the bizarre grounds that because 
Marx used only addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, Stalin 
had decreed that his planners must do likewise. Leontief eventually 
moved to Harvard, where his theoretical innovation assisted corporate 
planners to manage their capitalist empires. Many years later, he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.) 
But von Mises was fundamentally wrong in his conception of the 
question under debate. Marx did not think that socialists could do a better 
job than capitalists of running a capitalist economy. Marx had only the 
greatest admiration for the explosive efficiency of capitalism. No one has 
ever penned more effusive panegyrics to capitalism than Marx. What 
Marx said was that inevitably, ineluctably, socialist relations of produc-
tion would develop within capitalism, devised and advanced by capital-
ists, not by socialist moles burrowing into the heart of enemy territory in 
an effort to undermine their fortresses. 
If market forces were adequate to the task of making rational allo-
cations of scarce resources, there would be no internal impetus for the 
evolution of new ways of organizing production. But as we have seen, in 
a large modern corporation, the play of the market does not of itself re-
solve questions of allocation, resource use, and profitability. Capitalists 
do not develop internal planning models of economic decision-making 
because they have been seduced away from the faith of their fathers by 
tenured radicals on effete Eastern campuses who have never met a pay-
roll. They develop new modes of corporate decision-making because 
their accountants and financial experts cannot tell them, in a neutral, ob-
jective fashion, which of the available alternatives will be most profita-
ble. Our cardboard CEO, struggling to decide which of his division man-
agers has made the most significant contribution to the firm’s profits, 
must somehow resolve the disagreement between the two over the proper 
allocation of the fixed costs of the building in which their production 
takes place, and over the proper amounts to be charged against the box 
division’s accounts when it draws its raw materials from the stocks pro-
duced by the cardboard division. 
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Once the firm’s president becomes persuaded by his accountant’s 
argument, he realizes that the disagreements between his division man-
agers will have to be worked out politically—they will either have to be 
negotiated, or else he will have to decide them by an exercise of sover-
eign authority. 
In either case, what has happened, even in this very elementary 
case, is that a decision originally made for the firm by the market, and 
then made for the firm by an accountant, now has been transformed into 
a political decision to be made essentially by some form of political 
mechanism. In short, economic calculation has been replaced by political 
planning. 
No doubt, none of the actors in this miniature drama would consid-
er it in the slightest appropriate for what is usually called the “political 
system” to get involved in deciding how fixed costs are to be allocated in 
the cardboard carton firm. But though there might be many other reasons 
for keeping the city, the states, or the federal government out of the pro-
cess, the principal and most plausible reason—that the decision is best 
made by the impartial working of market forces—has evaporated. The 
decision isn’t simply economic; it is not actually an objective scientific 
decision at all. It is a political decision, required in order to resolve a 
conflict between the incompatible ambitions of the two division manag-
ers, one of whom is seeking to hold his job against the threat of replace-
ment, the other of whom is trying to advance her career by demonstrating 
her ability to run a division profitably. 
The situation we have analyzed in this hypothetical small firm is 
reproduced throughout the modern capitalist corporate world, with com-
plications, elaborations, and variations that cannot even be hinted at in 
our example. A major multinational corporation, as has often been re-
marked, is better compared to a state than an entrepreneurial firm. Con-
tained within it are huge bureaucratic systems and sub-systems in whose 
hallways and meeting rooms men and women live their entire working 
lives. The processes by which corporate-wide calculations of profitability 
are made involve considerations of tax codes, local ordinances, interna-
tional trade, exchange rates, inflation rates, and regional differential de-
velopment patterns that are substantially indistinguishable from the cor-
responding considerations weighed by economic planners in centralized 
national economies. 
The running of such a corporation requires systems of data acquisi-
tion and retrieval entirely beyond the capabilities of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century capitalist firms on whose behavior the original mod-
els of capitalism were based. To manage such information systems, and 
thereby to coordinate the decisions, the purchasing and shipping patterns, 
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the product development timetables, and the promotional campaigns of 
the many divisions of the firm requires an extremely high level of litera-
cy—both linguistic and computer—on the part of lower- and middle-
level, as well as upper-level, employees. Until it is possible to get relia-
ble answers quickly to questions about employee levels, warehouse in-
ventories, price shifts, exchange rates, and capital availability, those 
charged with the central planning of the corporation cannot even begin to 
carry out their tasks. 
Nothing resembling this level of information flow and consequent 
decision implementation existed in the early capitalist firms, not even in 
those that grew to great size in the nineteenth century. The importation 
into capitalist industrial organization of the model of military command 
and control was due at least as much to the sheer unavailability of any 
alternative way of managing and coordinating the behavior of large 
numbers of people as to the ideological affinity of the early industrial 
magnates for militaristic modes of organization. 
In short, when Marx talks about socialism, he has in mind an econ-
omy whose stage of development of technology and organization is so 
far advanced that national planning is technically possible. Such a stage 
exhibits both a certain level of technology of production, of data genera-
tion and retrieval, and of communication, and also a corresponding level 
of knowledge and skill on the part of workers at every level, not merely 
at the top. Although Marx failed to foresee the digital computer, it is not 
farfetched to say that his conception of socialism presupposed it, or 
something equivalent. 
Marx expected, for sound reasons, that the technology of produc-
tion, communication, and management required for the central planning 
and control of an entire economy would develop first within capitalist 
firms, in direct response to the pressures of competition and the demands 
of profitability. And so they have. An immediate consequence of this 
process is the transformation of economic calculations into political deci-
sions within the firm. Thus, if by socialism we mean the rationally coor-
dinated planning of an entire national economy in such a way as to trans-
form the major economic choices of the society into political choices, 
responsive to the will of the people, then it is true that socialism has been 
growing within the womb of capitalism, or at least that the technical pre-
conditions for socialism can be seen to be developing there. 
The economic systems established in the Soviet Union, in Eastern 
Europe, in the People’s Republic of China, and in a number of other na-
tions self-described as “socialist” were not in any usable sense examples 
of socialism. This description must be denied them not because of the 
character of their political systems, but quite simply because they did not 
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exhibit either the stage of development of productive forces or the level 
of development of, and rationalization of, relations of production pre-
requisite for what Marx meant by “socialism.” An economy cannot, with 
the best will and the strongest ruling party in the world, move directly 
from a feudal or early-capitalist economic organization to socialism. The 
reason has nothing whatever to do with piety, ideology, or the inexorable 
march of history. Rather, it has everything to do with the impossibility of 
planning food production rationally when you cannot even find out with 
any precision how many acres are under cultivation, or what the pattern 
of crop yields is from county to county, and when your work force is 
computer-illiterate. 
Note, by the way, that the development of efficient techniques of 
central planning within a modern capitalist corporation is advanced, not 
impeded, by the ambition, acquisitiveness, and egocentricity of the 
workers and managers. Switching over to a planning system in our carton 
factory does not require the development of socialist consciousness. It 
requires only that the objective structure of the firm make policy-neutral 
calculations of profitability theoretically impossible, as in fact they are 
once the second division of the firm starts to operate. Somewhat more to 
the point, the coherent management of large modern firms does not re-
quire that the capitalist mentality so often credited with the rise of mod-
ern capitalism be somehow transcended. The same men (and recently 
women) who manage the great corporations would, if they were sudden-
ly to find themselves running small firms in a classically competitive 
environment, adopt precisely the calculations of profitability traditionally 
conceived as determined for them by the free market. They do not do so 
when managing large corporations simply because it is technically im-
possible to do so. 
What, then, is the fundamental difference between socialism and 
capitalism at its most advanced, rationalized, and centralized? Under so-
cialism, economic decisions would be treated (I use the subjunctive be-
cause there does not yet exist a socialist society) as collective political 
decisions, to be made democratically on the basis of the aggregated will 
of the entire people. In a capitalist society, decisions are taken privately, 
within the firm, in response only to the interests, the will, or the pressures 
of those who occupy positions of power within the firm. 
The issues available for decision are not at all comparable in the 
two systems. A socialist society will be presented with choices among 
economy-wide investment policies or systematic wage policies that 
simply do not come within anyone’s ambit of decision in a capitalist 
economy. This, of course, is the principal source of the greater rationality 
of a socialist economy. But the mechanisms for the acquisition and man-
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agement of information, and the consequent management of economic 
activity, will have been developed and tested within the capitalist firm—
within the womb of the old society. 
III. WHY AREN’T WE HAVING FUN YET? 
It would seem, if this argument is correct, that things are proceed-
ing just as Marx anticipated. As capitalist social relations mature, the 
elements of socialist planning begin to develop deep within the corpora-
tion, which is truly the womb of capitalism. Why then are the prospects 
for social and economic justice so bleak? Why has the term “late capital-
ism,” once used by socialist theorists to describe what they confidently 
believed to be the death throes of the established order, now become a 
wry joke shared, with sighs and the rolling of eyes, by aging radicals like 
myself? Why have any signs of a true movement of the masses died out, 
to be replaced by an identity politics that is fundamentally assimilationist 
rather than revolutionary in its thrust? In short, if all is going as predict-
ed, why aren’t we having any fun? 
The answer, I think, is that along with everything that he got right, 
Marx got three big things wrong, with the result that the liberatory poten-
tial he saw in the internal contradictions of capitalism is nowhere in evi-
dence today. Let me say something about each of these failures of analy-
sis or prediction. 
First, Marx completely failed to anticipate that the capitalist state 
would develop the ability to manage and, to some extent, to control the 
increasingly wild booms and busts that threatened to destroy the capital-
ist order. He quite presciently foresaw that the ever more rational organi-
zation of production within the firm would come into contradiction with 
the anarchic distribution of the market, resulting in crises of over-
production and under-consumption. The great crash of ‘29 was just what 
the good Doctor of Philosophy ordered, albeit too late to gladden his 
heart. 
But Marx was convinced that capitalists, confronted with disaster, 
would be unable to coordinate their actions in order to save their skins. In 
an odd way, he was too much in thrall to the classical economic theory 
he had subjected to such a penetrating critique in Capital. It took imagi-
native, theoretical, and practical defenders of capitalism like Keynes and 
Roosevelt to see that with farsighted fiscal and monetary policies, the 
state could sufficiently dampen the business cycle to enable capitalism to 
survive. To put the point differently, Marx, very much in common with 
the other economists of his day, failed to see how powerful the state had 
become under capitalism. 
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The pulse still quickens in the circles I frequent when the tech stock 
market bubble bursts or Paul Krugman forecasts a calamitous reversal in 
housing prices, the way old war horses flare their nostrils and stamp their 
hooves at the sound of distant trumpets. But the truth is that our corpo-
rate masters will never again allow a serious threat to the foundations of 
the economic house they have built. 
Our mature capitalist economy is no longer the unplanned, unin-
tended consequence of the playing out of market forces, for all the lip 
service that its apologists pay to “free enterprise” on festive occasions. 
Rational planning is as pervasive at the macroeconomic level as it is 
within the firm. But that planning—far more sophisticated and nuanced 
than either Marx or the state planners of the Soviet Union could have 
anticipated—is securely within the service of private interests, not the 
public good. 
The second obstacle to the development of a revolutionary working 
class movement has been the persistence of pre-capitalist passions and 
attachments that Marx was convinced capitalism’s invasive rationaliza-
tion of economic life would weaken and ultimately destroy—nationalist 
loyalties, ethnic identifications, racial antagonisms, and religious faiths. 
The secularization of life seemed to be well under way in Marx’s time. 
The Catholic Church had lost its grip on public life in France, Germany, 
and Italy. As Marx had indeed predicted, the ancient antagonism of the 
urban and the rural was dissolving. And the ever-increasing mobility of 
both labor and capital bid fair to consign nationalist sentiment to public 
holidays and political speeches. 
The optimistic confidence that class interests would defeat the irra-
tionality of nationalism reached its height in 1914, as socialists world-
wide—my grandfather among them—refused to believe that French and 
German workers would fight one another in the trenches at the behest of 
their capitalist masters. With the bloody refutation of that belief, some-
thing died in the heart of the socialist movement. To be sure, the unantic-
ipated success of the Bolsheviks in Russia encouraged some to believe 
that despite all, the proletarian movement was on the march (though not 
my grandfather, who sided with Norman Thomas and the Mensheviks). 
But the success first of the Soviet Union and then of Mao’s revolution in 
China, important as they were to the unfolding of the twentieth century, 
had nothing at all to do with the birth of socialism in the womb of capi-
talism. 
In the United States, race had already opened a chasm in the work-
er’s movement that, in a revised form, persists to this day. When four 
million black men and women walked out of slavery, prepared for the 
free labor market with agricultural, craft, and industrial skills that they 
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had used as slaves to make the South rich, they encountered implacable 
hostility from white workers, whether immigrant or native-born. White 
workers until after the Second World War struck devil’s bargains with 
their employers, conceding labor peace and low wages in return for 
whites-only hiring practices. This fact, perhaps more than any other, 
doomed the American working class movement to eventual failure. 
At this nightmare moment in recent history, little need be said about 
the persistence and intensification of ethnic and religious antagonisms 
throughout the world. Try as we may, we socialists can no longer cling to 
the hope that class interests will unite men and women across national, 
ethnic, racial, and religious divides in a vibrant revolutionary movement 
to replace capitalism with a humane, just, egalitarian social order. Capi-
talists are doing their part. Not only are they crafting the elements of ra-
tional planning that a socialist economy would require but they also are 
in the forefront of efforts to put the divisiveness of race, ethnicity, na-
tionality, and religion behind us, for these divisions are not good for 
business. It is the people who remain mired in self-destructive and self-
defeating irrationality. 
Marx’s third and most serious mistake concerns the direction in 
which the labor force evolved as feudalism gave way to early capitalism, 
and then to the mature capitalism we see today. In the middle of the nine-
teenth century, when Marx was doing the British Museum research on 
which his hauptwerk was based, one of the most striking changes taking 
place in British society was the destruction of the old crafts—weaving, 
spinning, woodworking, and the rest—and the incorporation into ma-
chinery of the skills they once required. In late feudal and early modern 
times, a working man was known by the trade he plied, learned in a long 
apprenticeship and symbolized by the kitbag of tools he brought with 
him to the job. The complex social structure of crafts left indelible marks 
on the family names that so many Americans bear today—Wheelwright, 
Carver, Chandler, Taylor, Cartwright, Schneider, Schreiber, Weaver, 
Shepherd, Farmer, Smith. 
Capitalism ate away corrosively at the craft tradition, deskilling ar-
tisans and turning them into a homogeneous pool of semi-skilled workers 
who could master the skills of a factory job in a few weeks and were thus 
available to be moved easily from job to job by the fluctuations in the 
market demand for industrial labor. Marx saw this progressive homoge-
nization of the labor force as the correlate to the process by which small 
independent entrepreneurs were being crushed by competitive forces and 
absorbed into larger and larger firms driven to expand by a need to 
achieve control over their input and output prices. He foresaw a world in 
which a united industrial working class would confront concentrated cap-
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ital, until finally, when a major crash had fatally weakened capital, labor 
would seize control of the means of production and substitute socialist 
planning for capitalist anarchy. 
It was not only an inspiring dream, at least for some of us, but it 
was also a quite plausible projection of trends that were working them-
selves out powerfully in Marx’s day. But it was not to be. On the side of 
capital, as Marx anticipated, relentless concentration did take place, lead-
ing to the world of vast multinational conglomerates with which we are 
all familiar. To be sure, a subordinate domain of small business flour-
ished, rather like the flora that live under the soaring canopy in an Ama-
zon rain forest. Nevertheless, Marx got that part of the future right. 
It is on the side of labor that things have not progressed as Marx 
imagined they would. For a time, the growth of industrial capitalism did 
indeed produce a vibrant labor movement that evolved very much as 
Marx expected. First individual factories, then entire industries, finally 
entire national labor forces were organized, giving rise in the United 
States to the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industri-
al Organizations, while in Europe the labor movement was so successful 
that it was able to create and sustain major political parties. 
But as industrial capitalism gave way to a complex mix of industri-
al and service firms with huge, bureaucratically managed assemblages of 
employees, the leveling and homogenization ceased. There came into 
existence a pyramidal hierarchy of job categories with sharply unequal 
wage, salary, and compensation schedules. Instead of a world in which 
the propertyless masses sell their labor and are poor, while the owners of 
capital hire labor and live on the profits from this unequal exchange, we 
see today an economy in which even the very rich, by and large, are sala-
ried, and capital is owned by shareholders who exercise little or no con-
trol over what is nominally their property. Indeed, comfortably compen-
sated and securely tenured economists like Paul Samuelson, bemused by 
the reversibility of their equations, have taken to saying that it makes 
little effective difference to the economy whether capital hires labor or 
labor hires capital. 
This highly unequal allocation of the rewards and burdens of labor 
has undermined that solidarity on which Marx was counting. Steel work-
ers, miners, and textile operatives could forge some degree of unity, de-
spite their geographic dispersion and the many differences in the nature 
of their jobs. Even hospital and hotel workers, secretaries and fast food 
workers, could find some common ground on which to stand in their 
struggle against the exploitation inflicted on them by capital. But what-
ever theoretical connections there might be between them and lawyers, 
middle managers, and tenured college professors, the gap in the salaries 
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and conditions of labor between the two groups, the utter disparity in 
their life experiences and life chances, have made a fruitful solidarity out 
of the question. Workers have grown progressively less unified, until at 
long last, Organized Labor has come to be, and to be seen, as nothing 
more than an interest group, on a par with—but often less powerful 
than—gun owners, retirees, and fundamentalist Christians. 
All of us are familiar with this world—for it is, after all, our 
world—and we understand intuitively that our life chances are deter-
mined not by whether we own the means of production, but rather by 
where on the pyramid of jobs we end up. The shape of the income pyra-
mid in America has changed very little in the past century and more, save 
to become somewhat steeper. This in itself is odd, when we reflect that 
over that period of time America has been transformed from primarily an 
agricultural economy into to an industrial economy, then to a service 
economy, and now to an information age economy. One might plausibly 
have expected that so radical a series of transformations would work 
some alteration in the pattern of compensation, but it has not. 
Apologists for capitalism, who are now as common as houseflies, 
like to offer two connected explanations for the inequality in wages and 
salaries, which taken together are intended as a justification as well. The 
first rests on a misinterpretation of a famous eighteenth-century mathe-
matical theorem, the second on a common logical fallacy. 
Mathematics first. 
Leonhard Euler, the great Swiss mathematician, proved a theorem 
about linear homogeneous functions that was, in the nineteenth century, 
given an important economic interpretation. The theorem was construed 
as saying that under certain conditions, the wages paid to workers in a 
free and competitive labor market exactly equal their marginal contribu-
tion to the output of the firm for which they work, or as it is sometimes 
called, their marginal product. Thus, if a vice-president in an executive 
suite makes more than a secretary in the steno pool, it is because the 
vice-president contributes exactly that much more to the productive ac-
tivity of the firm. It would be both unjust and inefficient to take away 
some of the executive’s pay and give it to the secretary, even though they 
are both, no doubt, nice people and hardworkers. 
The problem with this rationale for unequal pay is that it turns out, 
upon closer inspection, not to apply to any known or even possible capi-
talist system. In the first place, the theorem holds only for economies 
whose production function is linear homogeneous (assuming that it even 
makes sense to speak of the production function of an entire economy), 
and as is easy enough to show, this is equivalent to saying that the econ-
omy is in long-run equilibrium. But as Marx pointed out, and as every 
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economist since has reaffirmed, capitalism is never in long-run equilibri-
um. A capitalist economy is always engaged in what Joseph Schumpeter, 
in a famous phrase, called Creative Destruction.9 Furthermore, it follows 
directly from Euler’s equation that a firm with a linear homogeneous 
production will, if it pays each of its employees his or her marginal prod-
uct, make a zero profit, and a firm regularly making zero profit will of 
course cease to exist. 
All of this is quite well-known to all economists, but it has not dis-
suaded them and their epigones from wrapping themselves in the sanctity 
of mathematics whenever proposals for wage and salary equalization 
surface. 
So much for mathematics. Now logic. 
When economists are asked why some employees are so much 
more productive than others, and hence deserving of such inflated com-
pensation, their standard answer is education, or as they sometimes say 
in an attempt to make the answer sound more impressive, human capital. 
Actually, that last sentence inverts the real order of explanation and thus 
participates in the ideological rationalization that I am attempting to de-
bunk. Let me restate the point: When asked to explain the striking ine-
quality in compensation schedules, economists begin by assuming that 
the inequality must be justified, for to think otherwise would be to call 
into question both the foundation of American society and their own 
comfortable compensation. Those of us at the top of the income pyramid 
must have a much greater marginal productivity, they conclude. And 
how can that in turn be accounted for? Education. 
Now, it is demonstrably true that in America today, your level of 
education (or, to be more precise, the number of years of schooling you 
have completed—not at all the same thing) powerfully affects where on 
the income pyramid you end up. Indeed, it may be the single most signif-
icant determinant. There are very few MBAs working on the loading 
dock, and very few K-through-Twelvers in the executive suites. 
But this fact does not imply that the shape of the income pyramid 
itself is in any way determined by the levels of educational attainment in 
the work force as a whole. If you have a college degree, your chances of 
climbing up the pyramid at least to the middle levels are quite good. But 
if everyone gets a college degree, the pyramid will not flatten out be-
cause there are only so many jobs at the middle level. 
To think otherwise is to commit what logicians call the Fallacy of 
Composition, which is simply the mistake of thinking that because some-
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thing is true of each member of a group, it can be true of them all. Each 
of us, we may suppose, can with hard work and determination, be above 
average, but only in Lake Woebegone can all the children be above aver-
age. 
Because the American economy is so large, it is easy to lose sight 
of this simple truth. For each individual, or for all immigrants, or for all 
African-Americans, or even, within limits, for all women, it is indeed 
true that greater educational attainment will tend to lead to higher com-
pensation, but that is only because the individuals or the group will over 
time displace some of those in the favored slots. If all the applicants for 
jobs at a corporation present themselves to the human resources office 
with MBAs, the board of directors will not terminate the positions of sec-
retary, mail room clerk, and claims adjuster and make everyone a senior 
manager! 
There is one way in which a dramatic educational upgrading of the 
entire workforce might conceivably trigger a flattening of the entire in-
come pyramid. With better prepared workers available, corporations 
might shift to different and more profitable production techniques, and 
those new techniques might result in an array of job positions with more 
equal associated compensations. Economists would say that the positions 
defined by the new production function had more equal marginal produc-
tivities, which as we have seen, is nonsense, but nevertheless, the end 
result might be a flatter pyramid. 
Is this likely to happen? Well, for more than one hundred years, the 
average level of educational attainment in America, as measured by 
number of years of schooling completed, has been rising. The level of 
education demanded by the production techniques and job specialties in 
the American economy has risen correspondingly. And the shape of the 
pyramid has remained essentially unaltered. Literacy, not to mention 
computer literacy, is today required even by such poorly paid jobs as de-
partment store clerk. And yet, no flattening of the pyramid can be dis-
cerned. 
What then does explain the shape of the income pyramid? A num-
ber of bright economists, willing to challenge the received wisdom, have 
been puzzling over this question for several generations. More than thirty 
years ago, Lester Thurow, the MIT economist who served there for a 
while as Dean of the Sloan School, published a little book called Gener-
ating Inequality that took a fresh look at the question.10 But although it is 
possible to give partial explanations, especially of an historical sort, for 
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the pattern of compensation in this or that capitalist economy, the seem-
ing permanence of the steep pyramid, its imperviousness to even the 
most striking changes in the world economy, remains a mystery. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thus, there is little prospect for the labor solidarity on which a suc-
cessful socialist transformation must be built. It is now the best of times 
and the worst of times. Economic rationality marches relentlessly on, 
while poverty and inequality harden into permanent injustice, and racial, 
ethnic, national, and religious rivalries tear the world apart. 
What can we anticipate for the future? What will my grandfather’s 
great-great-grandson, my grandson Samuel, inherit as he grows to ma-
turity? The impetus within corporations to substitute economic planning 
for subservience to market forces will strengthen, as the managerial class 
responds to the imperatives of institutional rationality. Meanwhile, the 
obscene gap between the gilded life chances of the fortunate and the life-
threatening poverty at the bottom of the world economy will persist and 
come to be seen as an inevitable concomitant of the rational workings of 
the market. 
There will always be class traitors like myself who rail against the 
inequality from which they personally benefit. But though our excoriat-
ing tracts may bring us tenure and advancement, the revolutionary trans-
formation they celebrate will seem as fanciful as the Chronicles of Nar-
nia. 
What then is the future of socialism? If socialism is the substitution 
of rational planning for the anarchy of the market, it is already upon us. 
If socialism is the achievement, at long last, of justice and equality, it is a 
dream that has been aborted in the womb of the old order. 
